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Transference and the
Ego: A
(Psycho)Analysis of
Interpsychic
Translation
Lauren A. Rutter
Bucknell University
Translation is a necessary part of ordinary psychological
development. A successful translation brings with it “unpleasure”
because the Kultur in which we live is a veneer of things we know
and have to suppress in order to mitigate the demands of the id
(das Es). Repression (die verdrangung) is motivated by our desire
not to feel unpleasure through translation. According to Freud,
manifestations of the id (das Es) are translated through the ego
(das Ich). The ego acts as the translator of drives (der Trieb) into
acceptable actions. Through the process of psychoanalysis, the
analyst assumes the role of the translator (ego).
Freud believed that spoken language is not important to
analysis of the unconscious. Spoken language has limits that do
not compare to the feelings or effects of the drives within us. In
nominalism, the thing is what the name is. Reality is bound by the
name you ascribe to that reality. Therefore, the world is defined by
the limits of language and given names. A notion of German
Romanticism is the possibility of infinite potentiation of language.
Language lacking limits has a magical quality that links two
worlds. There is a double consciousness between the two worlds
of thought/drive and the linguistic expression of the thought/drive.

One defines the other and they are interlocked. When drives are
translated into words by the ego and then expressed, this double
consciousness produces a double figuration. There is a translation
process from drive into language within the self, and then another
translation from language of the self into an outward expression to
the analyst.
The process of transference (die Übertragung) is suggested
by Freud to be a false connection. The client experiences
thoughts, feelings, and memories derived from previous events and
relationships and projects these onto the analyst. In this process,
through the translation of thoughts into expression to the analyst,
the client redirects feelings towards the analyst himself/herself.
The connection is false because instead of fixing the actual
problem, the problem is transferred to the analyst. The patient
believes that through expression, he/she is being finally
understood. The client may develop erotic feelings for the
therapist; these feelings may actually form a barrier and interfere
with the analyst helping the client.
Freud believed that the desire for cathexis (die Besetzung)
drives us. Cathexis is the libido’s charge of energy. This psychic
energy is attached to a person, object, or body. The release of this
charge of energy creates a feeling of pleasure, whereas, a
successful translation brings with it “unpleasure.” Repression and
transference are defense mechanisms used to cope with the
unconscious unpleasure.
Freud believed in three kinds of translations: intrasystemic,
intersystemic, and interpsychic. An intrasystemic translation
occurs writing a system of one language where there is a transfer
of one to another. An intersystemic translation is between
languages or somatic systems. For example, a hysteric performs
an intersystemic translation from body (ailments) to language
(complaints). The type of translation most applicable to
transference (die Übertragung) is interpsychic. This translation
focuses on the shift from object to object. Counter-transference is
also an interpsychic translation.
According to Freud, all of the following are translations:
dreams, hysterical, obsessive and phobic symptomatologies,
parapraxes, fetishes, choice of means of suicide, and the analyst’s
interpretations. To focus on the last example, the analyst’s own
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interpretations are a translation of the client’s expressed emotions
and behaviors. If the analyst is translating the already translated
double figuration, he/she becomes a third variable that deduces the
original drive (das Trieb). The analyst becomes the ego, but is
only human and thus imperfect. A translator can make mistakes,
and drives can be translated inaccurately. The ego cannot make
mistakes unless it is pressured by the id to act in a malevolent way.
The translator can easily make a mistake in evaluating a patient if
he/she is not careful.
In analyzing the patient, it is pivotal to be accurate in order
to provide an appropriate treatment plan. If the analyst makes
mistakes in translation, he/she is putting the patient at risk. One
way in which the analyst could make an error is by becoming too
involved in the patient’s own testimonies and narratives and thus
transfer his/her own repressed feelings to the patient. This is a
phenomenon known as counter-transference. Counter-transference
may lead to a skewed translation of drives.
Whereas Freud emphasizes transference and countertransference as projective identification techniques through an
interpsychic translation, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan
revises Freud in viewing the self as constituted by its relationship
to an other, with the primary developmental stage beginning with
the experience of viewing oneself in a mirror. Lacan’s mirror
stage is the first moment in which the subject recognizes the self in
a mirrored reflection. A transformation takes place when the
subject assumes identification in an image. This transformation
becomes an interpsychic translation.
Lacan described his ideas as “Return to Freud” because he
translated the ideas of Freud into a structural-linguistic
terminology that removed agency and subjectivity in their
interpretation. Though Lacan believed his philosophy was “Return
to Freud” in nature, many of his ideas differed significantly from
Freud’s. For instance, Freud believed that the unconscious and
linguistic conscious were two separate entities, very segregated
and only joined through the ego’s translation. Lacan, on the other
hand, believed that the unconscious was as complicated as the
conscious and therefore also structured linguistically. "For Lacan,
Freud's central insight was not…that the unconscious exists, but
that it has structure, that this structure affects in innumerable ways
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what we say and do, and that in thus betraying itself it becomes
accessible to analysis."1
Julia Kristeva departs from Lacanian ideology and argues
that Lacan’s bracketing of the drives (Trieb) “castrates” Freud’s
discovery. In Kelly Oliver’s “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father and the
Crisis of the Paternal Function,” she writes, “Kristeva, protecting
the Father of psychoanalysis from this castration threat by his most
prodigal son, reinscribes the drives in language. Her tactic is to
reinscribe language in the body, arguing that the dynamics that
operate the Symbolic are already working within the material of
the body and the presymbolic imaginary.”2 It was Kristva’s goal to
trace the signifier through the body in order to reinscribe the body
in language at the same time.
For herself, Kristeva sets up the difficult task of connecting
the body and language, and she chose to do so by recovering a
repressed maternal body and the abject maternal body. The
connection of language to body is an interpsychic translation
because it translates one object through another object. This case
uses language and bodies as the two objects. In addition to the
maternal body, Kristeva uses the notion of the imaginary father to
connect body and language. The imaginary father is defined by
Oliver as a screen for the mother’s love, associated, as it is, with
the child’s relationship to its conception and the mother’s womb.
“The imaginary father provides the support necessary to allow the
child to move into the Symbolic. This is a move from the mother’s
body to the mother’s desire through the mother’s love…The
semiotic body is abjected if necessary, but only for the sake of
what motivates the bond in the first place: maternal love.”3
Maternal love is a translator from body to desire, and therefore an
interpsychic translation. In order to understand this translation, it
is necessary to understand the notion of the semiotic body of
Kristeva and mirror stage of Lacan.
1

Malcolm Bowie, “Jacques Lacan,” Structuralism and Since: From LéviStrauss to Derrida, ed. John Sturrock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979),
118
2
Kelly Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father and the Crisis in the Paternal
Function,” Diacritics, Vol. 21, No. 2/3, A Feminist Miscellany
(Summer/Autumn, 1991), 43.
3
Ibid., 44.
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Kristeva believes that semiotic activity is the work of
drives that stem from a semiotic body.4 She studies the drives that
emerge prior to the mirror stage. Kristeva searches to describe the
way in which the infant body becomes the body proper. Oliver
writes, “She (Kristeva) complains that for Lacan the subject is
constituted at the expense of “the real,” the drives, from which the
subject will forever be cut off.”5 Kristeva wants to move away
from the notion of symbolic drives and focus on the real. For
Lacan, drives are symbolic. The analyst must assume the role of
the ego and translate the symbolic drives expressed by a client.
Kristeva is concerned with Lacan’s concept of the drive
(Trieb) because if the drive is already a symbol, the process of
signification becomes lost and the move between the semiotic and
the symbolic is “replaced with nothingness.” The lack brings out
the unitary being of the subject, and the subject’s being is founded
on this lack. Therefore, the drives are lost. “The subject of desire
lives at the expense of his drives, ever in search of the lacking
object.”6 At this point, it is the role of the analyst to step in and
interpret the drive so that the drive is not searching futilely for a
missing object. If the translator cannot assist, there is the threat of
no transference and therefore no interpsychic translation. The one
being translated is stuck in a confused state and is unable to replace
one object with another. However, there is also the optimistic
notion of the subject translating his/her own drives without the
assistance of a therapist who could skew the translation if
transference, counter-transference, or a simply a misinterpretation
of drives occurs. There is the idea of bringing back the semiotic
body to define the self without a third-party translator. The ego
itself can translate.
“For Kristeva, within Lacanian theory the living body is
sacrificed to desire. It becomes only a sign.”7 Kristeva argues that
when language is not mixed with drives, the drives become
repressed. Since the drives are repressed, one must enter into the
4

Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1980), 136.
5
Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1984), 131.
6
Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father,” 44.
7
Ibid., 45.
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symbolic realm and transcend the self to discover them.
Drives/desires/emotions experienced in the symbolic realm are not
real, and when one enters this realm for too long or cannot escape,
he/she must search for a translator to help them come back to the
real world. This translator is the analyst/therapist. However,
losing the ability to distinguish between the real world and
imaginary or symbolic, is becoming psychotic. In Kristeva’s
Revolution in Poetic Language, she writes, “…the exemplary
subject of Lacanian desire is the masochistic neurotic engaging in
autocastration and bodily mutilation or the completely catatonic
body of the clinical schizophrenic.”8 Translation of drives is a
necessary part of psychological development and must be done to
remove the self from the symbolic realm and understand the real.
Kristeva has several specific concerns with Lacan’s mirror
stage. They are:
Lacan’s account of the mirror stage emphasizes the body as
other, the body as symbol reflected in the “mirror.” It
throws us into a hall of mirrors where we can no longer
identify the “real” of the body; the real body is
impossible…Lacan’s account covers over the fact that
without the body there would be no reflection in the
mirror.9
Here, Kristeva struggles to explain what motivates the transition
from the presymbolic to the symbolic. Oliver writes that “Lacan,
of course, posits the castration threat as the motive. But in order to
experience this threat in the first place, the child must take the
position as a subject in the mirror stage.”10 The child must realize
that simultaneously he/she is and is not his/her image. The image
is a symbol, but it is also real. To see what is real, a translation
must occur between the body and the image of the body, the other.
Kristeva argues that the mirror stage requires a negation of the
other to identify the subject as self.
A translation is impossible when one cannot distinguish
between subject and other. If there is no transference between
8

Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 132
Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father,” 45.
10
Ibid., 45.
9
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object and another there is also no transcendence of the subject.
The subject is stuck in a realm without the possibility of selfdiscovery and needs a translator to explain the symbolic and the
real. Herein lies another problem identified by Kristeva with
Lacan’s theory: the paradox of its cyclical motion. She believes
that for Lacan, “…the child takes a position as subject so that he
can negate his image in order to take a position as subject.”11
Clearly, when the mirror stage is already symbolic, it cannot be
used to explain the onset of the Symbolic. Kristeva believes that
the only way to explain the change from presymbolic to symbolic
is to acknowledge the “material element, which is heterogeneous to
the Symbolic.” Rejection is not unique to the symbolic, but it
operates first in the semiotic body. This is different from Lacan’s
view that the symbol opens up the world of negativity.
Kristeva uses psychoanalytic principles of Freud to further
prove that negativity is “gestural and kinetic – the bodily act of
throwing and retrieving the reel.”12 She believes that the Symbolic
is founded both in lack and excess because if it were “merely
founded on a lack, then there is all the more reason for avoiding it
altogether, for taking refuge in neurosis and psychosis.”13 Since
the primary example of material negativity is anality, the notion of
the Symbolic founded solely on lack is disrupted. “In anality,
rejection precedes the Symbolic.”14 This disproves the Lacanian
theory that the move from presymbolic to symbolic is motivated by
a castration threat or sense of lack. In the place of lack, Kristeva
credits the notion of excess and pleasure that moves the child into
the Symbolic realm. The id and libido drives are therefore keys in
the discovery of the Symbolic realm. Excess is equally as harmful
as lack, and best controlled by the ego. Drives must be translated
by the ego to make sense of the self and remain balanced.
Kristeva’s feminist psychoanalytic theory places an
emphasis Lacan’s notion of returning to dyadic union. Lacan
believed that we are unconsciously trying to return to the dyadic
union of mother and child, which is lost in the mirror stage.
Kristeva explores the maternal function in and before the child’s
11

Ibid., 45.
Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 170.
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Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 151.
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attaining of subjectivity and entrance into the Symbolic realm.
“For her, material rejection operates according to a maternal logic,
which prefigures the Law of the Father. This law before the Law
is the law of the mother’s body which regulates the oral and anal
drives.”15 To explain this notion of law before Law, Kristeva uses
the semiotic chora, the organizing principle of the maternal body.
Kristeva defines the chora in a footnote in “Le sujet en proces”:
The chora is a womb or a nurse in which elements are
without identity and without reason. The chora is a place
of chaos and which is and which becomes, preliminary to
the constitution of the first measurable body…the chora
plays with the body of the mother – of woman – , but in the
signifying process.”16
In the chora, “maternal regulation sets up paternal
prohibition.” The mother is the regulator of what goes into and out
of her child’s body. She regulates the child’s body in relation to
her own. “Kristeva maintains that the first sounds the child makes
mimic his mother-child dyadic bodily relationship.”17 The mother
acts as the translator for her child’s drives, filtering out the
important and unimportant so that there is no excess or lack.
In order for the child to see itself as a separate entity from
his/her mother, an interpsychic translation from object to object is
required. The child must see the difference of his/her being from
the mother in order to attain more complex drives of his/her own
and language. When the child can see himself/herself as separate
from the mother, there is the responsibility to translate drives with
one’s own ego. This may create a problem for those who are
dependent on the translations of their mothers for what is right and
wrong. When the child realizes that he/she is not the mother,
he/she becomes a new subject and creates new language that
mimics the words of the mother. Kristeva argues that, “…it is the
incorporation of the patterns of language through speech of the
other that enables the infant to communicate and thus commune

15

Ibid., 27.
Julia Kristeva, “Le sujet en proces,” Polylogue (Paris: Seuil, 1974), 57.
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Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father,” 46.
16
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with others.”18 Since communication is central in psychotherapy,
language and imitation translation of the mother’s language in is
necessary for transcendence of the self. When the child’s
realization in the mirror stage forces a break in the dyadic union,
the child’s own ego must become the translator. The mother as
translator of drives will no longer suffice because the connection
has been severed.
For Kristeva, to become autonomous, a child must break
away from identification by abjecting its mother. The child
“…must move from an identification with the mother’s nourishing
breast to an identitication with its own birth and the horrifying
maternal sex…”19 Abjection is defined as “an absence (the
normative condition of the pre-mirror-stage infans) or a collapse
(the condition of the borderline patient) of the boundaries that
structure the subject.” Kristeva herself defines abjection as what
disturbs identity, system, and order.”20 Kristeva’s writings suggest
that the maternal body is an abject threat to the Symbolic.
Examples of prohibition against the maternal body are seen though
the oedipal prohibition against incest of Freud, against maternal
desire (jouissance) of Lacan, and/or against the semiotic chora of
Kristeva.21
For Kristeva, the primary drive pleasure threatens the
Symbolic, and is therefore repressed. Oliver writes that, “It (the
maternal body) threatens to uncover the process that leads to the
appearance of unity and thereby expose that unity as merely one
moment in the process. The unity of reason or consciousness
cannot admit that it is part of a process that alternates between
unity and the fragmentation and repetition of drives.”22 The
mother and child must sacrifice their connection so that the child
can become a subject proper.
While the mother and child are in a dyadic union, the
mother negotiates the demands of the child’s drives. The mother,
in providing a good model for behavior and language, also acts in
18

Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 47.
20
Shuli Barzilai, “Borders of Language: Kristeva’s Critique of Lacan,” PMLA,
Vol. 106, No. 2. (Mar., 1991), 295.
21
Oliver, 50.
22
Ibid., 48.
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the role of the superego. However, once the mother becomes the
abject, she does not correspond to an ego.23 The abject is excluded
from the superego because it threatens the Symbolic and the
identity of the newly established and autonomous subject. The
child now is forced to create his/her own supergo and ego to
manage the demands of the drives.
For Lacan, an interpretive act centers on the indirection of
language. In Volume 7 of Comparative Criticism, Gary Handwerk
writes on Lacan’s indirection of language and uses a translation to
explain the detours taken by the speaking subject in the path to
communication, “…That in which one must be interested is in the
point of knowing why she wished precisely that the other person
understand that, and why she did not say it to him clearly, but by
allusion…If you understand, you are wrong…”24 Lacan’s analysis
of the indirection of language can be used to explain an ironic
sense of self-identity which “lies at the heard of ironic selfpresentation.”25 The child who has just recognized his/her image
in a mirror reflection becomes the subject who is dependent on
others for status at any point. Hardwerk writes, “There is no such
entity as a subject, except by and with other subjects. This is a
subject whose definition is finally impossible…it is the sum of its
interrupted encounters with all its significant others, which serve as
moments of entry into death…which alone can definitively identify
the subject.”26 The subject becomes the other in the mirror stage.
For Freud, the risk of reduction of otherness is solved by
internalizing the other within the self. The unconscious is an other
that is always surrounding the subject. Even in becoming a
separate subject from the mother, the unconscious is not
accessible. The unconscious cannot be translated. Lacan writes,
“That in the subject, which is in the object and is not of the subject,
is the unconscious. The unconscious exists in and through speech,
but is inaccessible insofar as the signification of that speech can
remain concealed, censured by the ego.”27 The ego translates
23
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selectively to protect the self, and filters the drives that are harmful
to the body and mind.
Drives are essential to being human. The conscious,
unconscious and preconscious are all translated into behaviors and
emotions. In dyadic union, the mother is the translator for the
child’s drives. Her translation is perfect until the child realizes
they must be their own being in the mirror-stage of development.
In a break from the dyadic union, the child attains subjectivity and
agency. At this point, the mother loses the ability to translate the
drives of her child and the child’s drives are translated by the self.
The ego of the child becomes the translator of drives. The ego is a
stable and accurate translator, unless defense mechanisms fail and
the unconscious drives of the id pervade. If the ego fails to be a
translator that molds to fit societal and cultural norms, the subject
may decide to go through psychotherapy. At this point, the analyst
is the translator. The analyst, however, will never be as effective
as the mother or unblemished ego since the translation gets skewed
as it is passed from self to language to analyst. The pure
translation of the mother is lost in development of the child.
Although the loss of the pure translation is unconscious, it creates
an “unpleasure” that cannot be rectified. The self is not in a
constant state of suffering, however, so long as the ego can
compensate for the “unpleasure” through its own interpsychic
translation and defense mechanisms such as transference. In
psychological development, an interpsychic translation by the ego
takes the place of a pure translation of the mother.
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